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I. Introduction
One of the more frightening pictures in our society is one of a speaker be-
ing silenced, simply by virtue of who the speaker is; yet, the FDA engages in
that type of censorship on a regular basis. The FDA censors manufacturer
dissemination of truthful information concerning unapproved (o-label) uses of
prescription drugs, and does so at the expense of the First Amendment. Nor
does the FDA further its mission of protecting the health and safety of the
American public through its censorship. In fact, the FDA's rigid policy creates
more harm than good. Although o-label drug use can present serious harms,
there are more ecient and less constitutionally oensive means to minimize
such harms than through the FDA's current regulations.
Parts I and II of this essay will set forth the relevant regulatory scheme
and the current rubric for commercial speech jurisprudence. Part III exam-
ines the FDA's asserted justications and rationales for regulating information
1pertaining to o-label drug-use. Parts IV and V include a policy analysis of
the regulations, and set forth a few alternative solutions. This essay concludes
that not only do the FDA regulations violate the First Amendment, they do
not make good policy sense. The freedom agencies enjoy in the face of the
First Amendment is a serious problem in our society, one exemplied by FDA
regulation of manufacturer dissemination of truthful speech concerning o-label
uses.
Prior to the 1990's, the FDA's attempts to regulate manufacturer dissemi-
nation of scientic and medical information relating to unapproved uses of their
drugs remained mostly unnoticed and unchallenged.1 However, early in the
1990's, the FDA began attempts to regulate not just the dissemination of arti-
cles, but also manufacturer sponsorship of continuing medical education (CME)
courses.2 Around 1992, the FDA also began a concerted eort to regulate the
1In 1972, the FDA gave notice of a proposed rulemaking pertaining to o-label uses of
prescription drugs. According to the proposal, the FDA did not have authority to prohibit the
prescription of drugs for o-label use, but did have the authority to regulate the accompanying
labeling and information. See Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs;
Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration: Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (August 15, 1972). The Notice pointed out that
where a manufacturer or his representative, or any person in the chain of distribution, does
anything that directly or indirectly suggests to the physician or the patient that an approved
drug may properly be used for unapproved uses for which it is neither labeled nor advertised,
that action constitutes a direct violation of the Act and is punishable accordingly....
Id.
2Given its limited scope, this essay will not attempt to address the policy and constitu-
tional concerns raised by the regulation of industry-sponsored CME's. However, it is worth
noting that the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has declared that
the FDA's attempted regulation was unconstitutional. See Washington Legal Foundation v.
Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (issuing an injunction against the Final Guidance
on Industry Supported Scientic and Educational Activities, 62 Fed.Reg. 64074 (1997), the
Guidance to Industry on Dissemination of Reprints of Certain Published, Original Data, 61
Fed. Reg. 52800 (Oct. 8, 1996 ), and the Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Ref-
erence Texts, 61 Fed.Reg. 52800 (Oct. 8, 1996)) (hereinafter Friedman I); Washington Legal
Foundation v. Friedman, 36 F.Supp.2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that the 1998 injunction
was not limited to the three guidance documents challenged in the case) (hereinafter Friedman
II); Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 36 F.Supp.2d 418 (D.D.C. 1999) (granting
2manufacturers' dissemination of scientic and medical literature concerning o-
label uses of the manufacturers own products. The original, informal policy of
warning manufacturers by letter was eventually compiled and published as the
Guidance to Industry on Dissemination of Reprints of Certain Published, Orig-
inal Date3 and the Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Reference
Texts.4 Following the nding that these two Guidance Reports were unconsti-
tutional,5 as well as the passage of the Food and Drug Administration Mod-
ernization Act (and implementing regulations),6 the FDA in turn promulgated
another, similar attempt to regulate manufacturer dissemination of information
pertaining to o-label uses.7
In the 1997 FDAMA, Congress undertook one of the rst comprehensive rework-
ing of the Food Drug & Cosmetics Act in decades. In response to the threatened
expiration of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992,8 Congress, the FDA,
and the regulated industries worked together to produce FDAMA. In addition
to addressing concerns about the speed of drug approvals, the type of review,
and the clinical trial process, Congress also attempted to modify the FDA's
regulation of information relating to o-label uses. Specically, FDAMA tries
to eliminate First Amendment and policy concerns raised by the stringent reg-
summary judgment and issuing permanent injunction with respect to the three guidance doc-
uments) (hereinafter Friedman III). For an excellent response to the Draft form of the CME
regulation, see Bad Prescription for the First Amendment: FDA Censorship of Drug
Advertising and Promotion (ed. Richard T. Kaplan 1993).
361 Fed.Reg. 52800 (Oct. 8, 1996).
461 Fed.Reg. 52800 (Oct. 8, 1996).
5See Friedman I, 13 F.Supp.2d 51; Friedman II, 36 F.Supp.2d 16; Friedman III, 36
F.Supp.2d 418.
6Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, x 554(d), as amended, 21 U.S.C.A. xx 360aaa-3(d).
7The new regulations involved 21 U.S.C. xx 360aaa- 360aaa-6 and the FDA's Final Rule on
the Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs, Biologics,
and Devices, 21 C.F.R. Part 99.
8101 Stat. 4491 (1992), 21 U.S.C. 379g.
3ulation of manufacturer dissemination of information relating to o-label uses
of their products.
FDAMA (and its very similar implementing regulations) included several pro-
visions relating to manufacturer dissemination of o-label use information; four
in particular proved especially contentious. First, that a manufacturer must
submit an advance copy of the information to be disseminated to FDA, as well
as any clinical trial information and reports of clinical experience.9 Second, that
the manufacturer may disseminate o-label use information only if the manu-
facturer did one of three things: 1) submitted a supplemental application for
approval of the o-label use, 2) certied to the FDA that such an application
would be forthcoming, or 3) the Secretary made an exemption based on a nding
either that the supplemental application would be \economically prohibitive"
or would require \unethical studies."10 Third, any dissemination carried with it
armative disclosure obligations, including that a) the o-label use is not FDA
approved; b) the manufacturer is paying for the dissemination; c) any author re-
ceiving compensation from or having a nancial interest in the manufacturer; d)
current approved labeling; e) if applicable, that there are other approved prod-
ucts for the use; f) who funded the o-label use study; and g) a bibliography of
other scientic articles concerning the o-label use.11 Finally, the manufacturer
would be required to prepare and submit (semi-annually) to the FDA lists of
the articles and reference publications disseminated as well as the categories of
9See FDAMA x 551(b).
10See id. at x 554(a).
11See id. at x 551(b).
4recipients.12 The FDA clearly intended the regulations to provide physicians
with a more balanced view of the current state of the o-label use, as well as
providing an incentive to manufacturers to submit applications for unapproved
uses. Unfortunately, the FDA's attempts to achieve these admirable and legit-
imate goals come at the expense of the First Amendment and sound policy in
general.
II. The Constitutional Framework
The First Amendment, even in the area of so-called \commercial speech,"
promotes several important societal values. Briey stated, a free and open
exchange of information is conducive to better decisionmaking,13 a free market-
place of ideas (complete with competitive incentives), individual self-realization,
autonomy-enhancing,14 and a more ecient free economic market.15 In a demo-
12See id at x 553. See generally 21 U.S.C. x 360aaa; see also Washington Legal Foundation
v. Henney, 56 F.Supp.2d 81, 83 (citing Defs.' Suppl. Memo. at 7-8).
13Commentators such as Alexander Meiklejohn originally introduced the idea that speech is
essential to representative government and issues aecting \self-government." See. Meikle-
john, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948). Given our reliance on
a market economy as an important component of our society, the idea that the First Amend-
ment contributes to better decisionmaking applies in the commercial speech area as well. See
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976).
14As opposed to the instrumental view espoused in the decisionmaking and marketplace
of ideas rationale, the autonomy values focus much more on the intrinsic value of the right
to free speech. Some authors relying on this value would also extend First Amendment
protection to commercial speech. See, e.g., Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130
U.Pa.L.Rev. 591 (1982) (arguing that instead of a purely utilitarian or instrumental view,
the First Amendment is a means to the \much broader value of individual self-realization.");
David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 Colum. L. Rev.
334 (1991) (emphasizing the incompatibility of censorship with human autonomy, and the
impropriety of paternalism as a ground for interference with speech).
15Some authors would rely on a combination of all or some of these rationales, as opposed
5cratic and free-market society, there are strong utilitarian justications for more
information and for greater protection of speech. In a society that cherishes the
individual, there is an inherent value to self-expression and the ability to make
decisions for oneself. The regulation of information relating to o-label uses
undermines both types of values.
A. The Commercial Speech Category
Since the Chaplinsky case, the Supreme Court has accepted the idea that
there are certain categories of speech that either merit limited First Amendment
protection, or fall completely outside of the Constitution's protection.16 One
such category is \commercial speech," which enjoys less protection than other
types of speech. In 1942, the Supreme Court stated broadly in Valentine v.
Chrestensen17 that the First Amendment imposed no \restraint on government
as respects purely commercial advertising."18 However, the Supreme Court
later made it clear that simply having a commercial motive does not exclude
speech from protection.19 For instance, \movies and books have long enjoyed
to one specic value. See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 789 (2d
Ed. 1988); Steven Shirin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw.U.L.Rev. 1212 (1983).
16Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In upholding a conviction, the Court
described \ghting words" as one of the \classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." Id. at 571-72. For
an general analysis of the categorization as opposed to balancing approach, see Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court: 1991 Term- Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of
Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 293 (1992).
17316 U.S. 52 (1942).
18Id. at 54.
19In New York Times v. Sullivan, for instance, the Court rejected the argument that the
6First Amendment protections even though they are produced and distributed
for prot."20 As a result, the critical inquiry in cases is often whether the speech
is \commercial," a question that formed a signicant portion of the inquiry in
challenges to the FDA regulations.21 Until the mid-1970's, regulations infring-
ing upon so-called commercial speech were generally upheld, given the Court's
stance that commercial speech did not enjoy First Amendment protection.22
By contrast, from the time of the 1976 Virginia Pharmacy decision, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that even speech that does \no more than propose a
commercial transaction" is not completely outside First Amendment protec-
tion.23 The initial inquiry, as framed by the Court, was very similar to the
inquiry relating to o-label use information. \What is at issue is whether a
state may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful infor-
mation about entirely lawful activity, fearful of the information's eect upon its
disseminators and its recipients."24 The Virginia Pharmacy Court found that
the state could not. The Court started with the premise that \[g]eneralizing,
society also may have a strong interest in the free ow of commercial informa-
tion."25 More specically
First Amendment did not apply to a \paid `commercial' advertisement." 376 U.S. 254, 265
(1964).
20Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1175 (13th ed.
1997).
21See Friedman I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 62-66.
22A comparison of cases such as Martin v. Struthers and Breard v. Alexandria demonstrates
the importance of the \commercial" designation. In Martin, the Court held that it was
unconstitutional to apply a ban on uninvited door-to-door solicitation to Jehovah's Witnesses.
319 U.S. 141 (1943). In Breard, however, the Court found that application of a similar
ordinance to magazine subscription solicitors did not violate the First Amendment. 341 U.S.
622 (1951).
23425 U.S. 748, 759 (1976).
24Id. at 773.
25Id. at 764.
7So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the alloca-
tion of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in
the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free ow of
commercial information is indispensible.26
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy also explored the idea of solutions other
than inhibiting the free ow of information.
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That
alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people
will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and
that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather
than to close them.27
Even though the current test is the Central Hudson,28 the Virginia Phar-
macy factors have continuing relevance on a policy level. The information on
o-label uses is not inherently harmful, and given the existence of alternative
remedial schemes (e.g., tort) the assumption should be that scientists in re-
spectable journals will not want to publish harmful information. In addition,
as the Virginia Pharmacy court indicates, there is an independent value to in-
dividual decisionmaking, so long as the individual is informed. The entire goal
of limiting restrictions on o-label uses is to increase the ow of available in-
formation, thereby enhancing informed decisionmaking between physicians and
patients.
Since 1980, courts have applied the four-part Central Hudson test to speech
deemed commercial. The rst determination is whether the speech concerns
lawful activity and is not misleading.29 Next, the Court determines whether
26Id. at 765.
27Id. at 770.
28Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
29See id. The Supreme Court has taken a very dierent approach to dening misleading
that has the FDA historically. The Supreme Court has been much more likely to take the
8the asserted governmental interest is \substantial." If so, does the regulation
\directly advance[]" the asserted governmental interest. Finally, is the regula-
tion \no[] more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."30 On its face,
the fourth factor appears to call for a least restrictive means test; however, that
prong of the test has suered from a signicant degree of uncertainty. At one
point, the Court explicitly stated that the fourth prong is instead a question of
narrow tailoring and reasonable t, not least restrictive means.31
On the other hand, in 44 Liquormart the Supreme Court unanimously struck
down a Rhode Island regulation restricting advertising of liquor.32 A plurality
of the justices agreed that the regulations should be subject to strict scrutiny,
although the majority could agree only that the regulation failed the Central
Hudson test. For instance, Justice Thomas wrote in concurrence that:
In cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to keep
legal users of a product or services ignorant in order to manipulate their choices
in the marketplace, the balancing test adopted in Central Hudson should not
be applied, in my view. Rather, such an `interest' is per se illegitimate and can
no more justify regulation of `commercial' speech than it can justify regulation
of `noncommercial' speech....[A]ll attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens
by keeping them ignorant are impermissible.33
Although he did not command the majority, the breakdown of votes in 44
Liquormart could indicate a trend toward expanding protection of commercial
speech at face value. The FDA, on the other hand, has imposed requirements such as the
\fair balance" and \brief summary" rules. Since 1964, the FDA regulations required drug
advertisers to maintain \a fair balance" in presenting \a brief summary relating to side eects,
contraindications, and eectiveness" of their drug. 29 Fed. Reg. 257 (1964); 21 CFR xx
1.105(a)-1.105(e) (1964). In eect, the FDA has taken the position that arguably incomplete
information can be inherently misleading. For a simple example, the FDA could consider
giving the benets of a drug without the potential side eects to be misleading.
30Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
31See Board of Trustees, State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989).
3244 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
33Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
9speech.34
B. Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman (Friedman I)35
The FDA regulations of o-label uses have not fared well, even under the
commercial speech rubric. Originally, Judge Lamberth of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia assessed the FDA regulations before
the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 (\FDAMA").36 In Friedman I,
Judge Lamberth found that three FDA regulations failed the Central Hudson
test.37 Judge Lamberth applied the Central Hudson test after nding that the
identity of the speaker (in this case the manufacturer, not the researcher) was
an important factor in determining that the speech was commercial.38 Inter-
estingly, Judge Lamberth also assessed the potentially misleading eect of the
information, rather than the information itself, 39 conjuring up images of the
34The breakdown of votes was suciently complicated to preclude reading the Court's future
intent with any reasonable degree of certainty. Even the narrowest interpretation applying
Central Hudson included Justice Rehnquist, who had dissented in both Virginia Pharmacy
and Central Hudson. Id. at 518.
One potentially important case indicating a narrowing of First Amendment protection, but
that has not yet been suciently applied to show its signicance, is Glickman v. Wileman
Bros., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). The majority looked at mandatory fees for generic fruit advertising,
and found that speech was not implicated at all. However, there were strong dissents by four
members of the court.
35For a comprehensive analysis of WLF v. Friedman, see Comment: The FDA's Shrinking
Place in the Constitutional Universe. Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp.
2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (unpublished manuscript).
36See Friedman I, 13 F.Supp.2d 51.
37Id. At issue were the three Guidance documents, discussed supra note 1: the Guid-
ance to Industry on Dissemination of Reprints of Certain Published, Original Data (\Reprint
Guidance"), Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Reference Texts (\Textbook
Guidance"), and Final Guidance on Industry Supported Scientic and Educational Activities
(\CME Guidelines").
38Id. at 62.
39Judge Lamberth implied that one reason the speech could be misleading is the absence of
10clear and present danger test, which has been rejected with respect to other
types of speech.40
In reaching the commercial speech question, the District Court also rejected
threshold contentions that the regulations concerned conduct as opposed to
speech, and that speech by the heavily regulated pharmaceutical industry did
not enjoy First Amendment protection.41 The FDA also made the related ar-
gument that because the FDA enjoys the greater power to regulate the pharma-
ceutical industry in general, the agency also has the authority to regulate related
speech. Judge Lamberth, nding that the 44 Liquormart Court had overruled
the Posados holding that the \greater includes the lesser," also rejected this
contention.42
Judge Lamberth then went on to apply the Central Hudson test. Impor-
tantly, the District Court found that the conduct in question under the rst
prong was the o-label prescribing.43 Given that the FDA does not explic-
itly regulate the practice of medicine (discussed in more detail below), o-label
prescriptions are not illegal. In nding that the speech was not inherently
misleading, the court did discuss the possibility that the FDA could impose re-
a mechanism by which to distribute contrary information. Id. at 65. However, as discussed
below, the FDA in fact has signicant resources for a counter-information campaign, and
there do exist private medical and consumer watchdog organizations to provide such contrary
information.
40See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (altering the Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919) clear and present danger test).
41See Friedman I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 59-61.
42Id. at 61 (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484; Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs v. Tourism
Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986)).
43See id. at 66.
11quirements to decrease the possibility of misleading speech.44 For example, the
injunctive relief applied only to certain classes of information, with a focus on
the level of expertise and independence of the source.45 Under the second prong
of Central Hudson, the court acknowledged that the government does have a
legitimate substantial interest in creating incentives to compel manufacturers
to get o-label treatments on-label.46
The FDA regulations also directly advanced the substantial interest by creat-
ing an incentive to submit new uses to the FDA's pre-market approval process.
The real problem for the FDA was that the regulations were \considerably more
extensive than necessary to further the substantial government interest."47 In
Judge Lamberth's words, \the most obvious alternative is full, complete, and un-
ambiguous disclosure by the manufacturer."48 In issuing an injunction against
certain types of FDA restrictions, the court focused on factors encouraging inde-
pendent and dependable research. Specically, Judge Lamberth found that the
FDA could not \prohibit, restrict, sanction or otherwise seek to limit" manufac-
turer dissemination of articles \previously published in a bona de peer-reviewed
professional journal," or reference textbooks (or portions thereof) \published
by a bona de independent publisher and otherwise generally available for sale
in bookstores or other distribution channels where similar books are normally
available...".49
44See id. at 68-69.
45See id.
46See id. at 70-72.
47Id. at 73.
48Id.
49Id. at 74.
12In response to a subsequent request to limit the application of the injunction to
the pre-FDAMA regulations, Judge Lamberth emphasized that Friedman I was
intended to apply not just to the actual three guidelines, but to the underlying
policies as well.50
The Court's decision and injunction must be read to apply to the underlying
policies of the FDA, and not merely to the express provisions of the Guidance
Documents, given the history of the policies at issue, which have been expressed
in various documents over the years.51
In so phrasing his response, Judge Lamberth implied that regardless of the
iterations of restrictions, the FDA will face a sti battle when attempting to
regulate in this particular area. The District Court went on to invite the parties
to submit additional brieng respecting the eect of FDAMA.52
C. Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney53
In July of 1999, Judge Lamberth found that the FDAMA implementing regu-
lation on manufacturer dissemination of information pertaining to o-label uses
(the Final Rule on the Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses
for Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Devices (\Final Dissemination Rule")), vio-
lated the First Amendment.54 Specically, Judge Lamberth declined to exempt
50See Friedman II, 36 F.Supp.2d 16, 18. Judge Lamberth then granted summary judgment
and issued a permanent injunction. See Friedman III, 36 F.Supp.2d 418.
51Id.
52See Friedman II, 36 F.Supp.2d at 19.
5356 F.Supp.2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999).
54Id. See generally 21 U.S.C. x 360aaa for the relevant statute, as well as the Final Rule on
the Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs, Biologics,
and Devices, 21 C.F.R. Part 99. Given the fact that \the FDA regulations issued pursuant to
13the FDAMA implementing regulations from the scope of the injunction granted
in Friedman I.55 After disposing of an additional threshold argument presented
in the defendant's supplemental brieng,56 the court once again applied the Cen-
tral Hudson test. In nding that the speech was not `inherently misleading,' the
court noted that \the defendants themselves admit to the importance of ensur-
ing the availability of such information to physicians and health care providers
making prescription and treatment decisions."57 Under the second prong, the
court once again dismissed the contention that \ensuring that physicians receive
accurate and unbiased information upon which to make prescription decisions"
was a suciently substantial governmental interest.58 In fact, the Judge issued
a strongly worded response:
The government, however benign its motivations, simply cannot justify a re-
striction of truthful nonmisleading speech on the paternalistic assumption that
such restriction is necessary to protect the listener from ignorantly or inadver-
tently misusing the information.... [t]his axiom is particularly powerful where
the recipient of information is a sophisticated listener trained extensively in the
use of such information{ as are the doctors and other health care providers in
this case.59
The District Court did accept that the FDA's second justication, that of
the FDAMA, while adding some detail to the language of the FDAMA, do not dier materially
from the act itself," the court analyzed the statute and regulation as one. WLF v. Henney,
56 F.Supp.2d at n.4.
55See id.
56The defendant claimed that \the Court should not apply First Amendment commercial
speech scrutiny to the FDAMA because...the act `armatively permits' speech so long as it
complies with the requirements of the statute." Id. at 85. The court replied strongly that
\[t]his is, of course, preposterous. The First Amendment is premised upon the idea that people
do not need the government's permission to engage in truthful, nonmisleading speech about
lawful activity." Id. The opinion went on to oer the following example: \the government
could not justify a law criminalizing criticism of the government on the theory that such a
law would `armatively permit' pro-government speech." Id. Accordingly, \[n]either can the
FDA escape judicial review of its speech restrictions on the theory that they `permit' speech
that complies with the FDA's wishes." Id. (footnote omitted).
57Id.
58Id. at 86.
59Id.
14encouraging manufacturers to submit the o-label uses for approval.60
As the court did not accept the government's asserted interest in preventing the
dissemination of biased information interest, many of the FDA's requirements
were doomed, as they did not advance a substantial and legitimate government
interest.61 The opinion did conclude that one requirement did directly advance
the substantial governmental interest in encouraging supplemental drug applica-
tions.62 This requirement stated that a manufacturer may disseminate o-label
use information only if the manufacturer did one of three things: 1) submitted
a supplemental application for approval of the o-label use, 2) certied to the
FDA that such an application would be forthcoming, 3) the Secretary made an
exemption based on a nding either that the supplemental application would
be \economically prohibitive" or would require \unethical studies."63 However,
the court then found that the FDAMA \amount[ed] to a kind of constitutional
blackmail- comply with the statute or sacrice your First Amendment rights."64
The court concluded that \such a gross imposition upon free speech is in clear
violation of the First Amendment, and it cannot stand."65
D. The Commercial Speech Category, a Problem for the First Amendment
60See id.
61Id.
62The Court rejected the contention that the other FDAMA provisions encouraged addi-
tional applications because they made speech more cumbersome. In so doing, the noted that
`[t]his argument is immediately suspect because...it restricts constitutionally protected speech
as an incentive device." Id. at 87 n.7.
63Id. at 86-87.
64Id. at 86. It is worth noting here that the court in WLF v. Henney combined its analysis
of the FDAMA and the implementing regulations, so the opinion applies to the FDAMA itself.
See id. at n.4.
65Id.
15As a policy matter, the categorical approach has become increasingly prob-
lematic, and \commercial" speech as a category does a disservice by potentially
legitimizing the troublesome categorical approach. The traditional presumption
under First Amendment jurisprudence is that the government bears the burden
of showing the necessity and legitimacy of regulations burdening speech. As
a result of the categorical approach, by contrast, certain types of speech fall
completely outside the scope of First Amendment protection.66 According to
the Chaplinsky Court, regulation of certain \classes" of speech do not raise any
\Constitutional question."67 Once within a categorical exception, the presump-
tion and burden shifted from the government to the individual. Government
authority to regulate or even prohibit certain categories of speech was not con-
sidered by the post-Chaplinsky Supreme Court to be a violation of the First
Amendment.68
However, as it became more and more dicult to dene certain types of
speech, and as our societal understanding of the subjective nature of these cate-
gorical labels increased, the Supreme Court has moved away from the categorical
approach. In areas such as incitement (or ghting words), the Supreme Court
has not found speech to be within that category since Chaplinsky itself.69 From
66Examples include \ghting words" and \obscenity."
67315 U.S. 568, 571-72.
68See id.
69Gunther & Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1078. One commentator has in fact proclaimed
that the ghting words doctrine is \nothing more than a quaint remnant of an earlier morality
that has no place in a democratic society dedicated to the principle of free expression". Stephen
W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 Wash. U.L.Q. 531, 535-36 (1980).
16a subjective point of view, some of the speech certainly had the eect of incit-
ing (if not always the intent), but the Supreme Court has greatly limited the
categories. The area of obscenity provides a particularly illuminating example:
one man's lth is another man's art. The idea of \lewd" or \profane" speech
as unprotected has also become increasingly limited.70 In addition, given the
interplay between civil rights and speech, the Supreme Court has had to ac-
knowledge the crucial role of speech in informing and activating individuals.71
One category that has survived, with astonishing vitality in fact, has been that
of the commercial speech, as dened by the Central Hudson test and its progeny.
However, the categorical approach does not work in the commercial speech ei-
ther, so the Supreme Court should continue the trend of extending protection to
all speech, regardless of its previous classication. Although the Supreme Court
has attempted to narrowly dened commercial speech, it has become progres-
sively more dicult for the courts to determine what qualies as commercial
speech.72 An additional problem that occurs in much greater relief in the com-
mercial speech area, is that the dispositive question is often who is speaking,
and not what the speaker is saying. As Judge Lamberth noted, there is no ques-
tion that the speech at issue in the o-label use cases would undoubtedly enjoy
70The Court in Cohen v. California found that a jacket emblazoned with the phrase \F***
the Draft" was protected speech, and essentially shifted the burden to the \listener" to avert
their eyes. 403 U.S. 91 (1971). An unacceptable solution was to prohibit the speech in the
rst instance.
71By the same token, recent speech codes seek to address the fact that some views of civil
rights demand regulation of oensive and hateful speech. See, e.g., Matsuda et al., Words
that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment
(1993).
72For instance, in Friedman I, the court spent a considerable amount of time determining
whether the speech was commercial or \pure." Friedman I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 66-65.
17protection if it was disseminated by anyone except the manufacturer.73 Even
worse than a content-based censorship, the Supreme Court is now engaged in
censorship based on the speaker's identity. In fact, the Supreme Court recently
acknowledged that \[e]ven under the degree of scrutiny that we have applied in
commercial speech cases, decisions that select among speakers conveying virtu-
ally identical messages are in serious tension with the principles undergirding
the First Amendment."74 The commercial speech doctrine, based as it is on
the outdated categorical approach, ignores the fact that although the motive
for the manufacturer could be economic, the listener (either the patient or the
doctor) does not have an economic motive, but does have a right to the free
ow of information.
III. Justications and Rationales
A. The Potential Harms
The o-label use of prescription drugs does potentially lead to several serious
harms. First, although the drugs have been approved, the FDA approves these
only drugs for specic uses. As a result, the fact of approval might be irrele-
vant to the safety or ecacy of an o-label use. The testing system is based
on the requirement that the manufacturer seek approval for particular uses for
73\It is beyond dispute that when considered outside of the context of manufacturer pro-
motion of their drug products, CME seminars, peer-reviewed medical journal articles and
commercially-available medical textbooks merit the highest degree of constitutional protec-
tion." Id. at 62.
74Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc. v. United States, {U.S. {, {, 119 S.Ct. 1923, 1935
(1999).
18the drugs. As a result, the test groups will exhibit certain characteristics, and
the participating individuals could closely resemble one another in dispositive
ways. Therefore, the general applicability of such studies are inherently limited.
To take an example, for a cancer drug, the test group will share certain char-
acteristics, and more importantly, researchers will control for discrete, specic
variables. Researchers could be looking for particular genetic predisposition to
cancer, to interaction with other types of treatment, and will be focused on
cancer specically. To transfer the results to a dierent group, perhaps those
suering from acne, would undermine the applicability of the original study. In
addition, unapproved uses could step outside of proportional risk.75 The FDA
could approve a potentially dangerous drug to ght a lethal disease, but not to
ght a skin condition.76
Second, reliance on an ineective o-label drug use could preclude or discour-
age the use of a more eective drug. Nor is this concern limited to the area of
o-label uses.77 In the case of o-label uses, because the drug does not have
to go through the rigorous testing process, which tests both safe and eective,
there is a greater potential for error. The end result could be that patients are
prescribed an ineective drug. Patients could then ignore continuing or addi-
75One example of an o-label use was the prescription of powerful heart drugs, approved to
control severe arrhythmia, for cases of mild arrythmia, which unfortunately provoked heart
attacks. See Tom Abate, Americans to be Guinea Pigs in Debate Over O-Label Drug Uses/
Results to determine whether speed or safety should be top priority, San Francisco Chron-
icle, 1999 WL 2694411 (August 30, 1999). Although the risks did not become clear until
later, it is possible that the FDA would still have approved the drug in the face of a health
threat the magnitude of severe (but not mild) arrhythmia.
76The counter-argument, explored in greater depth below, is that patients should be making
the cost-benet analysis themselves in any event.
77For example, one alleged problem with dietary supplements, or less regulated medical
devices, is that patients rely on these \cures" to the exclusion of eective remedies.
19tional symptoms, thinking that they are currently being treated, when in fact
they are not.
A contributing factor increasing the potential harm of o-label uses (but one
that arguably undermines the need for regulation) is that there is generally less
information generally available to consumer/patients about prescription drugs
as opposed to OTC drugs. Ironically, this lack of information is due in large part
to the strongly restrictive regulation of prescription drug advertising and label-
ing.78 The currently available sources of information (advertisements, physician
package inserts, and the Physician's Desk Reference, to name a few) do not give
adequate information relating to o-label uses. The FDA's regulations restrict-
ing manufacturers' ability to allude to o-label uses in the advertisements or
package inserts has had the perverse eect of keeping patients uninformed. As
a result, it is even more important that doctors be more informed about poten-
tial new uses for drugs.
The numerous arguments in favor of direct-to-consumer advertising also ar-
gue in favor of more information to doctors. There are several situations in
which it is preferable for more information to be available: for previously un-
treatable conditions, for more eective treatments, for potentially embarrassing
conditions, and given that manufacturers often cannot advertise (especially o-
78The interaction of the broad denition of labeling with the strict labeling regulations,
including required and prohibited information, means that many otherwise available channels
of information are limited or precluded. Congress did re-examine the broad labeling require-
ments, but made only modest adjustments. FDAMA x 126. Although the FDA claims not to
be regulating the information as labeling per se, information only falls outside of the reach of
labeling if it meets the requirements set forth in FDAMA. See id. at x 557(b).
20label uses) at least the doctors would have access to more information, if nothing
else as a trigger about a current patient. Of course, the fact that there might
be less information generally available could militate against allowing more in-
formation only to doctors, in that it could further reduce the patient's role in
treatment. The general dearth of information could also eliminate the patient
as a check on an incorrect or hurried doctor, especially in the age of the HMO
and capitation.
A more general argument, and one that Judge Lamberth in particular ad-
dresses, is the problem of fraud prevention.79 Across the board, the FDA ghts
against fraud, in the form of economic adulteration, misbranding, misleading
labeling, and more. One part of the agency's mission is to ght fraud and de-
ception. The FDA has determined that sending out articles touting o-label
uses are \inherently misleading,"80 a determination is entirely in keeping with
the FDA's general regulation of drug labeling and advertising. The combined
eect of the broad denition of labeling81 and the \fair balance" and \brief sum-
mary" requirements has meant that the FDA enjoyed wide discretion and power
over manufacturer's speech.82 As a result, the FDA has been very successful
at requiring manufacturers to provide more complete information, meaning the
potential negatives at well. Not content with product warnings for inherently
dangerous drugs, the FDA has a laundry list of requirements for the \brief sum-
79See Friedman I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 65-69.
80See id.
81See Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948).
82See generally 21 C.F.R. x 202.1
21mary." With the attached articles and other promotional activities, the FDA
has determined that the source of the information, as well as the alleged lack
of balance, are inherently misleading. However, this is not necessarily a sound
premise, especially in light of the intended audience. This area is dierent from
direct-to-consumer advertising or the OTC market in that a physician must
prescribe the medicine. The information is not aimed at the traditional \ig-
norant, unthinking, and credulous" segment of the population.83 Instead, the
information is aimed at the highly educated physicians, who have reputational
and liability concerns of their own.84
B. The Constitutional Argument
The FDA also asserted two particularly interesting legal arguments: that
the regulations are aimed at conduct not speech, and even if the regulations
do eect speech, the pharmaceutical industry is so heavily regulated that the
manufacturers should not expect or enjoy traditional First Amendment protec-
tion. The idea that the regulations are aimed at conduct as opposed to speech
are not completely without merit, especially in light of the analysis in Friedman
I. Although Judge Lamberth rejected this conduct argument, in applying the
83\[I]t must be noted that the manufacturers are not seeking to distribute this information
to the general consumer public, who likely lack the knowledge or sophistication necessary to
make informed choices on the ecacy of prescription drugs." Friedman I, 13 F.Supp.2d at
70.
84Judge Lamberth emphasized the eect the intended audience has on the FDA's asserted
rationales. See id.
22Central Hudson test, he did rely heavily on the nding that the regulated activ-
ity was the actual prescribing of o-label uses.85 This reliance appears to create
a tension with the predicate nding that the regulations concerned speech.
The heavily regulated industry argument is one that the FDA has success-
fully advanced in the Fourth Amendment context.86 However, Judge Lamberth
rejected this argument as well, relying primarily on precedents dismissing the
argument. There is also a very logical reason to distinguish the Fourth and First
Amendments with respect to this argument. As Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence has developed, one important factor has been a reasonable expectation
of privacy.87 In a heavily regulated industry, or location, the expectation of
privacy cannot reasonably be as high as in a home for example. As a result, the
Supreme Court has found that the Fourth Amendment places less of a restric-
tion on government conduct with respect to drivers, and the food industry, to
name just two examples. However, the First Amendment is not so dependent
upon a contextual analysis. Finally, there is a textual argument: the Fourth
Amendment contains the modier \unreasonable," while the First Amendment
on its fact is a blanket prohibition of government restrictions.
IV. As Applied: The Policy Arguments
A. Regulating the Practice of Medicine
85See id. at 66.
86See U.S. v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1981).
87See id.
23In addition to specic examples of restricting the availability of or informa-
tion about certain types of treatment, the FDA's current regulation of o-label
uses also invokes other, more general themes and potential harms. At one level,
the FDA is coming perilously close to regulating the practice of medicine. Al-
though never explicitly precluded from doing so, the FDA does not regulate the
practice of medicine (in the sense of what approved drug a doctor may prescribe
for what purpose), and it does not make good policy sense for the FDA to at-
tempt to do so.88 One traditional argument in favor of delegation to agencies,
and for increasing agency authority in general, is that of expertise. However, in
the area of medicine, it is simply not the case that in general an FDA bureaucrat
will have greater expertise than even a general practitioner. In addition, the
FDA employees are too far removed from individual interaction to accurately
calculate cost-benet analysis for everyone. In the eld of treating specic ail-
ments, a general, one size ts all rule will be both over-and-underinclusive. The
doctor is in a far superior position to make that analysis, especially in conjunc-
tion with their patient.
88Since the 1972 Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Legal Status of Approved Labeling for
Prescription Drugs: Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration,
the FDA has arguably conceded that the current regulatory scheme does not extend authority
to the FDA to regulate the practice of medicine, at least with respect to prescribing o-label
uses. 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (August 15, 1972). As the FDA explained
In United States v. Phelps Dodge Mercantile Co., 157 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1946), the court
held that violations while products are held for sale after interstate shipment did not come
within the jurisdiction of the Act. As a result, Congress [amended the Act with respect to
adulteration and misbranding]. The 1948 amendment did not, however, also extend the reach
of the new drug provisions of the Act.
Id. As the Notice continued, \[t]his interpretation of the Act is consistent with congressional
intent as indicated in the legislative history of the 138 Act and the drug amendments of 1962."
Id. Interestingly, with respect to medical devices, section 214 of FDAMA explicitly states that
FDAMA is not intended to interfere with traditional physician authority. By the same token,
the medical profession ercely guards its own notions of being a self-regulated profession. See,
e.g., Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (1982).
24Society has also already determined that we have a certain level of trust in
doctors. We heavily regulate the process of becoming a doctor, and there exist
a wide range of tort remedies against negligent or tortious conduct by doctors.
At a certain point, we acknowledged that doctors are better situated that FDA
employees to \practice medicine." In addition, Congress has agreed with that
societal assessment: the FDA is arguably not empowered to regulate the actual
practice of medicine. In the current regime, the FDA eects the practice of
medicine not just through the obvious prohibition on unapproved drugs, but by
limiting the free ow of information to doctors. In a practice that resembles
a prior restraint, the FDA has determined that the most appropriate method
is to cut o the ow of information, rather than to engage in a counterattack
of information.89 Traditionally in First Amendment jurisprudence this type of
preemptive action has been highly disfavored, and there is no reason why there
should be an exception in the communication of truthful information from man-
ufacturers to doctors.
B. The Paradigmatic Slippery Slope
89Although the Supreme Court has upheld prior restraints of commercial speech, the same
policy arguments against prior restraints in other areas also apply in the commercial speech
context. John Milton wrote in protest against the practice as early as Areopagitica- A
Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing (1664). As William Blackstone described
it, the major danger in subjecting the press, for example, to \the restrictive power of a licenser
[is] to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the
arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and government."
4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *151-52. In the case of the FDA,
the pre-market approval process allows one individual in an administrative agency to have a
vast impact on the course of progress in science: what is currently \good science."
25At a broader level, a strong slippery slope argument exists supporting the
need to rein in the FDA. The FDA has traditionally shown itself very willing
to take highly aggressive stances on contentious issues, even to the point of
endangering the Constitution. There is a strong need to send a message to the
FDA that there are certain limits, and more specically, that magic words and
recitation cannot justify active censorship. The FDA consistently relies on its
mantra that its actions are in the interest of public health and safety. However,
the FBI can also make a strong case that those words exactly capture its mission
as well, but we still apply the Fourth Amendment to FBI actions.90 At the very
least, explicit Constitutional prohibitions such as the First Amendment should
serve as a presumption shifting device. In which case, the FDA would bear the
burden of proving that each regulation is justied in the face of the Constitution,
and more importantly, that some type of least restrictive means is applied.91
C. The Capture Problem
One particularly troublesome possibility, and one which is pervasive in the
administrative state, is the idea of agency capture.92 To take an example of
how this could work in general in the FDA context would be in determining
90In the context of the FDA, the court has concluded that the industry's Fourth Amendment
rights are much more limited, given its inclusion in the \class of closely-regulated businesses."
U.S. v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 651 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1981).
91Cf. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (1982) (setting
forth a negative theory of the First Amendment, based on government's inherent inability to
regulate speech); Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 Wm & Mary L.
Rev. 1 (1989).
92See generally, George J. Steigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ
& Mgmt Sci. 3 (1971). (introducing the concept of what we now call agency capture).
26the denition of a standard food. If the Florida Orange Growers have 10% fruit
juice and 90% water, but their competitors use only 5% juice, the Florida Or-
ange Growers have a strong incentive to set the standard level at 10%. One of
two things could happen. Either the agency could be \captured" in the sense of
setting the level at 10%, thereby \leveling the playing eld" at a level too high
for smaller players, or, as happened in the infamous peanut butter incident,
the battle over setting the standard could take up to twenty years to resolve.
The amount of agency resources expended in the peanut butter example, quite
possibly to prevent fraud, could not possibly justify the incremental benet to
the consumer.
One scenario some have argued represents industry capture of the FDA re-
volves around the renewal of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA)93
and FDAMA. The 1992 PDUFA had a ve-year term, at which point the Act
would expire in the absence of armative congressional action. The impend-
ing expiration of PDUFA provided the impetus for passing FDAMA; given the
increasing FDA reliance on the user fees, the industry was able to gain certain
concessions industry had been wanting for some time. Although most would
argue that FDAMA represents a positive for all parties concerned, it is also
true that with the user fee, the regulated industry now has a certain amount of
leverage over the agency itself. In addition to the actual provisions of FDAMA,
the FDA has also bound itself to relatively stringent performance goals for areas
such as application reviews and drug development times.
93106 Stat. 4491 (1992), 21 U.S.C. 379g.
27Playing this agency capture idea out in the context of o-label drug use, there
are several possible explanations for why certain portions of the \industry"
could actually support strong regulations. First, there is the possibility, such as
in the aspirin example, that an OTC drug could have broad therapuetic eects
in an area currently cornered by the prescription drug makers. In the aspirin
example, the pharmaceuticals would have to compete not only with the OTC
drugmakers, but also the generic drug market, at potentially great expense.94 A
second possible interaction would be between the dietary supplement industry
and the pharmaceutical drug industry. Unfortunately, in both scenarios, it is
quite possibly the consumer/patient who is ultimately paying the price for turf
wars. Doctors are deprived of information about possibly cheaper unapproved
alternatives while huge pharmaceutical drug manufacturers guard their ultimate
prots. Although this scenario is purely hypothetical, it does demonstrate that
established segments of the industry could have the means by which to take
advantage of the conservative nature of the FDA.
D. Resource Allocation
The issue of resource allocation is one of the most pressing for any agency.
In this case, the FDA in particular is strongly limited by its funding. The FDA
has only one billion dollars to regulate food, drugs, and cosmetics. As a result,
94In a related case, the Federal Trade Commission and several states have brought suit
against the increasingly powerful generic drug manufacturers, alleging antitrust violations.
See FTC v. Mylan Laboratories, In., 62 F.Supp.2d 25 (D.D.C., 1999).
28the FDA must be especially careful to choose the most harmful areas, and to
concentrate resources there. For example, active fraud creates a huge concern,
particularly in the drug area. In the food area, given the recent outbreaks
of lethal food contamination, the FDA should perhaps focus there. Instead,
the FDA has chosen to simultaneously oend the First Amendment and basic
notions of triage by regulating information given to doctors about o-label uses
of previously approved drugs. The drugs at issue have already been approved as
safe and eective.95 Therefore, it makes much less sense for the FDA to focus
resources on this area that poses on average a less extreme risk to the public
health and safety.
E. The Structural Flaws
1. Missing Checks and Balances
One of the most problematic aspects of the FDA in particular is that the
FDA fullls the dual role of regulating both the approval process as well as the
advertising process. As a result, repeat player companies not only do not have
an incentive to challenge FDA actions, but the industry in fact suers from a
serious disincentive.96 As a result, recent challenges do not involve industry
members such as Merck or Upjohn, instead, public interest organizations such
95It is undoubtedly the case that the context could be very dierent between the approved
and o-label uses. The possible harms such as dierences in the test group and the preclusion
of a more eective remedy are discussed more thoroughly supra Part IIIA.
96One commentator has given this situation the very apt label of \structural censorship."
See Comment, supra note 35, at.
29as the Washington Legal Foundation have taken up the ght to protect the
First Amendment.97 The FDA wields incredible power through the pre-market
approval process. Companies that spend billions of dollars in hopes of approval
will be strongly discouraged from irritating the FDA in any way. Whether or
not there has empirically been retaliation is immaterial- the mere threat of retal-
iation creates a sucient disincentive to industry challenge. The FDA's current
dual function of approval and advertising regulation also creates at least the
appearance of impropriety and images of power-hungry bureaucrats preventing
legitimate First Amendment challenge not through overt actions, but through
the reservoir of power.
Another important eect of this dual function and disincentive is the substantial
limit on the role of the judiciary as a check on agency action. Even in light of
the judiciary's permissive attitude toward agencies98 there are certain lines that
the courts would presumably draw in the sand. The First Amendment might
be a good place for the judiciary to start limiting agency authority. Regardless
of the argument of judicial abdication of its checking function on the agencies,
the judiciary has not even had the opportunity to apply checks.
Another check one might presume existed would be Congress itself, but Congress
has shown itself to be remarkably willing to initiate the legislation undermining
97Other recent cases include plaintis such as the Nutritional Health Alliance and the Na-
tional Council for Improved Health. See Nutritional Health Alliance v. Shalala, 953 F. Supp.
526 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), armed in part, and vacated and dismissed in part, 144 F.3d 220 (2d
Cir. 1998); National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 1997).
The latter case demonstrates another problem with the dual hat disincentive: the Tenth
Circuit dismissed the suit for lack of standing.
98For example, in the wake of Chevron, the courts have taken an extremely deferential
view toward agency construction of the enabling statutes. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Young v. Community Nutrition
Institute, 476 U.S. 974 (applying Chevron to the FDA).
30the First Amendment. Depending on the political climate, Congress could de-
termine that its interests would be best served by oering restrictive advertising
legislation, rather than attacking the product itself. Two recent examples of this
phenomenon include tobacco and alcohol. As o-label drug use is neither a clear
benet nor danger, Congress has apparently determined that allowing the FDA
to regulate the advertising rather than the products themselves is preferable.99
2. The FDA's Conservative Nature
The FDA, like many agencies, has an inherently conservative nature.100 The
agency's high prole leads to a greater reluctance to approve a potentially harm-
ful drug, as opposed to \merely" delaying approval. In addition, the FDA could
see more harm in allowing the promotion of o-label uses than in not having
the drug available. Meaning, if requiring pre-approval of additional uses would
be the end result of the FDA's restrictions on advertising, that would not be
the disfavored result for the FDA. The possible harms of not having a dierent
treatment available would be outweighed in the mind of the FDA by the poten-
tial harm of allowing an o-label use. In addition to the possible harms to the
public health and safety, like any other agency or institution, the FDA also has
99See also, Richard T. Kaplar, The FDA and the First Amendment in Bad Prescription,
supra note 2.
100One of the seminal articles introducing the concepts of false negatives and positives, and
advocating a more conservative approach in the context of the EPA, is Talbot Page, A Generic
View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 Ecology L.Q. 207 (1978). With respect to
the FDA, one interesting article examining the eects of a conservative approach is Steven
R. Salbu's The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of Scrutiny in the
Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U.L.Rev. 93 (1999).
31reputational harms.
One systemic reason for the FDA's reluctance to allow greater o-label use is its
reluctance to assess Type-II harms. In other words, in the FDA's cost-benet
calculus, the harm from the lack of a drug is less likely to be considered, if
such potential harm is even quantiable.101 To take an example, aspirin has
a wide o-label use for heart disease prevention. The Type II analysis would
consider those lives lost to heart disease because individuals did not have access
to the potential curative eects of aspirin. However, in the FDA's defense, that
number would be very hard to assess, if at all possible. A pervasive problem
with Type II analysis is that they often end up resembling attempts to prove a
negative.
In all fairness, it is perhaps not reasonable to expect that the FDA would
provide a check on itself. In other areas, such as the Fourth Amendment and
Due Process claims, not only has the FDA determined that the public health
and safety rationale was a suciently compelling rationale, but the courts have
consistently agreed.102 However, these cases provide a greater lesson: we cannot
count on the FDA to adequately weigh valid First Amendment concerns.
101See, e.g., Salbu, supra note 94 for a case study relating to FDA approval of protease
inhibitors and the ght against HIV.
102See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
32F. Not an Option
One seemingly obvious response is that manufacturers should simply submit
the o-label uses for approval; unfortunately, the current approval system makes
that option a disfavored one. As the legislative history to FDAMA indicates, not
only is there not an incentive to submit supplemental applications, there may
in fact be disincentives. Even the supplemental applications could represent a
time-consuming and expensive process. Section 403 of FDAMA represents an
attempt to encourage submission of supplemental applications, but its eects
have yet to be seen. So one net eect of the need for an expensive approval
process for additional uses has been to discourage additional uses and research
into additional uses of already approved drugs. It is also possible that the FDA's
regulations create an incentive to go to the black market, as opposed to waiting
for drugs made more expensive by the pre-market or supplemental approval
process.
V. The Solutions
A. One hat per agency
One obvious solution to this problem would be to return regulation over
advertising to the Federal Trade Commission, where it was until relatively re-
cently.103 The FTC already regulates the advertising aspect of several areas
103Under the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Act the FTC had authority to regulate drug advertising. 15
U.S.C. 55(a).
33of FDA control, and putting prescription drug advertising in the FTC would
eliminate the \structural censorship" currently embedded in the FDA. Another
at least partial solution would be to reduce the denition of labeling, which
currently blurs the line between advertising and labeling, and protected and
non-protected speech.
B. The Existing Layers of Protection
The FDA does not stand alone in wanting to protect the American public.
There are at least three other safety nets for each individual: the doctor, the
manufacturer, private organizations, and the individual themselves.104 The o-
label uses at issue in this paper relate only to prescription drugs: meaning, a
doctor must prescribe the drugs. The doctor is by denition a certied practi-
tioner, in tort law in fact, the doctor is the learned intermediary. We already
acknowledge that doctors have a special role, and allowing the greater ow of
information to doctors should have the positive eect of increasing communica-
tion between doctors and patients as well. In this area, is that one size does not
t all. Here, in consultation with her doctor, and individual can make an in-
formed decision, assessing the level of risk that she personally is willing to take.
An attempt to make a risk assessment, possibly with respect to life-threatening
diseases, at the national level, simply does not make sense. Although styled as
104Interestingly, FDAMA x 403(d) requires the Secretary of HHS to develop policies to
encourage collaboration between the government and professional medical and scientic orga-
nizations and societies.
34a prophylactic rule, the FDA's policy does not take into account the Type II
harms that occur when otherwise eective remedies are not publicized or avail-
able.
The manufacturer also has an important stake in the entire process. Given
the availability of tort remedies, in some cases to the point of manufacturer
bankruptcy, the manufacturer also has an incentive to limit publication of o-
label uses to only those that are suciently tested and safe.105 In addition,
there are private organizations that play an important role in informing and
protecting the public. Associations and institutes such as the American Medi-
cal Association and the National Cancer Institute provide just two alternatives
to strict FDA regulations. Given the fact that a signicant percentage of cancer
treatments are o-label106 (although the number is somewhat skewed by the
fact that the FDA doesn't approve compound drugs in any event), the NCI
already plays a signicant role.
Finally, the scientic community as a whole has an important stake, especially
in the current FDA scheme. Publications must appear in \bona de" publica-
tions, such as peer-reviewed journals.107 The apparent rationales behind the
current emphasis on peer-reviewed journals include a higher reputational stake
for better-known journals, as well as a more-deserved assumption that the in-
formation in such journals are reliable, and reect better scientic methods and
105The breast implants provide particularly high prole example of tort remedy (although
not necessarily related to o-label use). As for o-label uses, testimony in WLF v. Henney
indicated that manufacturers could potentially face liability stemming from o-label uses. See
Guinea Pigs, supra note 75.
106See id.
107According to the Friedman I and WLF v. Henney decisions, the injunction applies
only to those articles and sources meeting certain criteria. See generally supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
35studies. Scientists must put their names on the research, and their peers must
sanction its publication in order to give the research even the minimum of credi-
bility. Taken in conjunction with the liability-adverse nature of the doctors and
manufacturers, there is a conservative trend to the non-FDA protections as well.
Each level has not only their reputation but a potentially disastrous lawsuit at
stake. The FDA's apparent premise that the situation pits the susceptible indi-
vidual against the money-hungry, evil manufacturing industry is simply not an
accurate portrayal.
C. Fight Fire with Fire
One time-honored maxim in the First Amendment realm is that the solu-
tion to speech with which one disagrees is more speech, not to silence those
with whom you disagree. Given the resources at the government's disposal, this
maxim applies particularly well when it is the government that seeks to silence.
In the case of o-label uses, the FDA has several methods by which it can pro-
mote consumer understanding of the potential harms of o-label use. Not only
has the FDA already proved itself very adept in the information age (for exam-
ple, its extremely comprehensive webcite) but one should never underestimate
the power of the press. Press releases and notication of the press of potential
abuses of the system by the huge, faceless, pharmaceutical industry could be
front-page news.
36D. Trust the Citizen
Another, related, First Amendment concept is that in general the First
Amendment favors dangers of misuse over dangers of suppression. This ar-
gument is hard to make given the potentially lethal eects of misuse in this
case. However, an argument in favor of First Amendment protection is that
regardless of the risk factor, the FDA should eschew paternalism and allow
the physician and patient to make an informed decision together, instead of
eliminating a potentially helpful drug. The cost-benet analysis in these cases
goes on a two distinct levels: whether any o-label use promotion should ever
reach the physician, and whether the patient should follow a particular o-label
treatment. The First Amendment weighs heavily on the side of allowing the
information in general, for utilitarian and autonomy-enhancing reasons. As for
the individual case, it should be for the patient and physician to assess the
amount of risk the patient is willing to assume in the hopes of a cure.
VI. Conclusion
The FDA's regulation of manufacturer dissemination of truthful informa-
tion concerning unapproved uses directly violates the First Amendment. More
importantly, the regulations violate the spirit and values imbued in the First
37Amendment. Finally, the FDA's censorship at best does not contribute to its
mission of protecting the health and safety of the American public, and at worst
actually undermines its own mission. There are sucient protections in place
for the patient/consumer, so the FDA should respect the First Amendment and
its own institutional mission and cease regulating manufacturer dissemination
of truthful speech.
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